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The back cover text of this excellent monograph closes with a bold remark on its method-
ology: “[T]he assumption that the fundamental laws of physics are simple in terms of the
fundamental physical properties and relations is pivotal. Without this assumption one gets
nowhere” when trying to “extract the fundamental structure of the world from theories of
physics.” I couldn’t have put it better myself. One caveat, though: I’m not sure ‘simplicity’
is the best name for the cocktail of considerations appealed to here as premises. Arntze-
nius privileges spatiotemporally local and separable ontologies, for example, but these strike
me as virtues of easy conceptual intelligibility or methodological conservatism rather than
simplicity. Regardless, the reader can look forward to a marshalling of non-empirical the-
oretical virtues behind various alternative pictures of fundamental reality, in search of the
best metaphysical explanation for some of the successes of modern physics.
Arntzenius offers no worked-out theory of simplicity and the other virtues, but here he
is in good company (nearly everyone’s). In cases where empirically equivalent hypotheses
are on the table, we must trust that the intuitions of scientifically-trained scholars typically
encapsulate a rough but reliable sense of a theory’s standing with respect to theoretical
virtues. Since scientists themselves carry on without any systematic picture of these virtues,
theoretical science itself could not proceed without this assumption.
Could one ask for a better method? One could ask, I suppose, but one would have
better luck asking for a pony. Given the state of the field at present, the alternatives are
to give up on the sort of questions Space, Time, and Stuff asks, or to use something like
Arntzenius’s method to (tentatively) answer them. I like the way Arntzenius proceeds. The
reader should just keep in mind that these are tentative conclusions with only slightly more
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evidential backing than opposing views.
The bulk of the book tackles several puzzles about space and time: the familiar contro-
versy between substantivalism and relationism, the existence of instantaneous velocity, and
pointless or “gunky” spaces. Arntzenius is perhaps the leading authority on the latter two
topics, so as one might expect, his treatment of these issues is very rich. The discussion of
substantivalism, relationism and related issues is equally rich, and notably, it largely avoids
rehearsing tired thought experiments from the existing literature in favor of posing interest-
ing new ones. For example, Arntzenius introduces the character of the “strong relationist
about time,” who holds that there are no temporal relations between events at different
spatial locations. By examining this fascinating straw man, Arntzenius sheds considerable
light on the virtues and vices of saner related positions, such as the view that there are no
spatial relations between objects at different times.
This is the greatest virtue of Space, Time, and Stuff : the book is bursting with great ma-
terial on central topics that can’t be found anywhere else. It opens with a clear, minimally
technical exposition of Julian Barbour’s anti-realism about time, along with the methods
used by Barbour (in concert with Bruno Bertotti) to formulate a “timeless” version of New-
tonian physics. This is the best introductory treatment of Barbour’s physics I know of, and I
would advise anyone interested in this topic to begin with Arntzenius’s first chapter. Chapter
7 is a foundational survey of the CPT theorem and related issues, another essential resource
that was previously missing from the literature. This chapter is extremely up-to-date, and in
particular it discusses the breakthrough work of Hilary Greaves and Teruji Thomas, which
has not yet been published.
Some of the best chapters have more to do with the nature of matter (stuff?) than with
space or time. Chapter 3, “The World According to Quantum Mechanics,” is especially
interesting. Rather than trying to arbitrate the old dispute about which interpretation of
quantum mechanics is the best, Arntzenius picks one (the many-worlds interpretation) and
asks which picture of microscopic reality is most successful, assuming that interpretation’s
answer to the measurement problem. While the other major interpretations are already well-
understood in this regard, in many-worlds this is work that still needs doing. Unlike many
other proponents of many-worlds, Arntzenius has the sensibilities of an ordinary scientific
realist rather than a structural realist. So for those of us who are still scratching our heads
and wondering what “structure” is supposed to mean, his approach is a welcome change of
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pace.
After the virtues of competing ontologies are compared, Arntzenius comes down in favor
of the “Heisenberg operator realism” of Deutsch and Hayden, with Wallace and Timpson’s
“spacetime state realism” a close second. Both these pictures proceed by assigning fun-
damental quantities to regions of spacetime (represented by field operators in the former
case and local density operators in the latter), in such a way that the expectation values of
observables can be reconstructed as functions of these fundamental quantities. Arntzenius
is judicious in comparing these ontologies to one another, but I would like to see the story
of their empirical adequacy fleshed out further. I gather that his two preferred versions
of the many-worlds theory are supposed to be empirically equivalent to the ordinary the-
ory because one can derive the expectation values of observables from them. But what is
an observable quantity like energy or momentum, on these pictures, when the fundamen-
tal quantities are just given by operators assigned to regions? And what meaning does a
statistical expectation value have in the contemporary many-worlds interpretation, which is
entirely deterministic and involves only a thin notion of probability (as the decision-theoretic
weight rational agents will assign their successors in future branches of the universe’s state)?
These aren’t rhetorical questions, although I think they are tough ones. I would just like to
hear more.
The book closes with what may be its most significant and lasting contribution: an
attempt (co-authored with Cian Dorr) to reduce all of the mathematics needed for physics
to geometry alone. Although the title is “Calculus as Geometry,” they do not mean to reduce
calculus to the geometry of abstract mathematical spaces, but rather to the geometry of the
concrete space that physical objects exist in. This approach is inspired in many ways by
Field (1980), but it is not unambiguously nominalist in the same sense, since it supplements
ordinary physical space with a fiber bundle over that space, which gives the possible values
of gauge fields. Moreover, they freely employ mereology in their constructions. But as they
point out (rightly, I think) the game need not be to satisfy some ideal of “true” nominalism.
Rather, their project is to make do with less ontology than the traditional mathematical
Platonist.
That said, substantivalism about the fiber bundle is a controversial assumption. Although
it is probably fair to say that such substantivalism is “independently-motivated” (p. 263),
it has also been the target of powerful objections, for example by Healey (2007). So we
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have an interesting contest between the parsimony of Arntzenius and Dorr’s picture and the
theoretical considerations Healey raises against fiber bundle substantivalism.
Equally interesting is their suggestion of a new, nominalist-friendly theory of quantity
according to which the values of a physical quantity like mass correspond to points in “mass
space,” occupied by physical objects. This is perhaps best understood as a new alternative
to both absolutist theories of quantity (in which values of mass are fundamental monadic
properties) and comparativist theories (in which relations like “twice as massive as” are
fundamental). But close analogues to the older theories will, I think, persist. For example,
like the spacetime substantivalist, the realist about mass space must determine whether the
points in the mass space we actually live in bear primitive relations of identity to points in
other possible worlds. If so, the resulting theory will be similar to absolutism, in that the
possibility where every object has twice its actual mass is a distinct possibility rather than
a re-description of the actual world. Otherwise, mass space theory will be more analogous
to comparativism in this regard.
Space, Time, and Stuff is ideal for the advanced reader. I wouldn’t necessarily recom-
mend it to a beginning student or someone totally unfamiliar with related literature. The
book can be a little fast at some points, a little careless with details at others. I didn’t
find any places where the glossed-over details made a difference to the arguments, though.
I had a blast reading Space, Time, and Stuff. Metaphysicians and philosophers of science
interested in the metaphysical edge of their field will find a lot here that’s genuinely new,
creative and exciting. Not just about space and time. The title promises stuff, and the book
delivers a lot of great stuff. I’d even go so far as to say that the stuff is the best part.
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